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10 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 
THE RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
APPLICABLE TO BILLS AND NOTES 
A STUDY IN CoMPARATIVE LAw 
l\I uch uncertainty exists in this country concerning the rules 
of the Conflict of Laws applicable to Bills and Notes. In Eng-
land the law on the subject was codified by the Bills of Exchange 
Act. The Negotiable Instruments Law fails to lay down rules 
for the Conflict of Laws and thus leaves the matter as it was 
before. Through the unification of the law of Bills and Notes, 
which has resulted from the adoption of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law by practically all of the states of this country, the 
conflicts that will arise with respecJ: to such instruments in the 
future will result, in the main, where the rules of the Negotiable 
Instruments Law of this country come into collision with those 
of a foreign nation. Though there are some important differ-
ences between the Negotiable Instruments Law and the English 
Bills of Exchange Act it may be said that there exists, on the 
whole, quasi-uniformity in the law of Bills and Notes of the 
English speaking countries. ·wide divergencies continue to exist, 
however, between the Anglo-American system and that of other 
countries, which is embodied now in the Convention of the 
Hague, of June, 1912. As the prospect that these differences 
will disappear in the course of the next half century is quite 
remote, a study of the rules of Private International Law which 
should govern where the rules of the Anglo-American system 
come into conflict with those of the Convention of the Hague is 
not without practical interest. In view of the many uncertainties 
in our law a codification of the rules of the Conflict of Laws on 
the subject \Vould be highly desirable so that a greater uniformity 
of decision might be obtained in this regard/ Such a codification 
should be undertaken, if possible, with a full knowledge of the 
best thought on the subject in other countries. It is the object 
of the present article to make such a preliminary investigation 
in the hope that it may throw some light upon the actual prob-
lems which _will demand solution in any attempted codification of 
the Conflict of Laws relating to Bills and Notes. The ends of 
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this article will be subserved best if the comparative study be 
limited to those continental countries which have given, on the 
whole, most thought to the study of the subject under considera-
tion. These are, beyond question, France, Germany, and Italy. 
The discussion of the law of other foreign countries, excepting 
that of England, would tend to obscure the main issues without 
adding anything especially new or helpful. 
I. CAPACITY 
Neither the Negotiable Instruments Law, nor the Bills of 
Exchange Act, nor the Hague Convention has attempted to lay 
down a uniform municipal rule governing capacity. In England 
and the United States the ordinary rules relating to capacity 
apply also to bills and notes.1 On the continent there were for-
merly many special restrictions affecting the capacity of parties 
to obligate themselves by means of bills and notes, and in a few 
countries some of these restrictions still subsist.2 The principal 
conflicts that may arise will relate to the capacity of married 
women and infants. What should be the rule in the Conflict of 
Laws governing their capacity to bind themselves by bill or note? 
I. English law: The Bills of Exchange Act3 does not answer 
the above question. The general rule governing commercial con-
tracts therefore applies. What the English law on the subject 
is cannot be stated with certainty. There appears to be only a 
single case throwing direct light upon the subject, that of Male v. 
Roberts.4 In that case an action was brought in England to re-
cover a sum of money advanced in Scotland to an infant who 
appears to have been domiciled in England. L::>rd Eldon, at 
Nisi Prius, held that the defense of infancy depended upon the 
lex loci contractus, the law of Scotland. At the time the decision 
was rendered, the English law seemingly favored the view, both 
with respect to ordinary commercial contracts and contracts of 
1. For a comparative statement of the municipal law relating to capacity, 
see Weiss, Traite de Droit International Prive, 2nd ed., IV., pp. 439-440; 
Ottolenghi, La Cambiale nel Diritto Internazionale, pp. 43-44; Diena, 
Trattato di Diritto Commerciale Internazionale, III, pp. 42-44. 
2. So, for example, officers in the active army in Austria. See, Jette!, 
Handbuch des internationalen Privat-und Strafrechts, p. 117. 
3. Section 72 (2) lays down the rule that the "interpretation" of the 
drawing, indorsement, acceptance or acceptance supra protest of a bill is 
determined by the law of the place where such contract is made. But 
this term is not comprehensive enough to include "capacity." See, Lafleur, 
The Conflict of Laws in the Province of Quebec, p. 184. 
4. (1800) 3 Esp. 163. 
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marriage, that the law of the place where a contract was entered 
into determined the capacity of the parties." A noticeable change 
in the English cases appears during the latter half of the nine-
teenth century, indicating a decided tendency to adopt 'the con-
tinental view, which regards the question of capacity as belong-
ing to the personal law and as subject, therefore, to the lex 
domicilii or the lex patriae.6 In the case of Sottomayor v. De 
Barros1 the Court of Appeal per Cotton, J. says: "As in other 
contracts, so in that of marriage, personal capacity must depend 
on the law of the domicile." And this rule is said to be "a well 
recognized principle.'' In Cooper v. Cooper8 the Lord Chan-
cellor, Lord Halsbury, makes the categorical statement that 
"The capacity to contract is regulated by the law of domicile." 
These statements were mere dicta, as both cases related to mar-
riage. Foote9 feels, nevertheless, that the dictum of the Court 
of Appeal in Sottomayor v. De Barros "has unsettled the whole 
subject, if, indeed, it has not gone further, and established the 
right of the lex domicilii to .decide all questions of capacity for 
every purpose." 
The recent cases of Ogden v. Ogden10 and Chetti v. Chetti11 
seem to support the lex loci contractus, but these cases, likewise, 
involve capacity for marriage and it is not clear that the state-
ments were intended to apply to ordinary mercantile contracts. 
5. Lord Stowell expressed this view forcibly in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 
(1811) 2 Hagg. Cons. 54, a case involving capacity for marriage, in the 
following words: "It is an indispensable rule of law, as exercised in all 
civilized countries, that a man who contracts in a country, engages for 
a competent knowledge of the law of contracts in that country. If he 
rashly presumes to contract without such knowledge, he must take the 
inconveniences resulting -from such ignorance upon himself, and not 
attempt to throw them upon the other party, who has engaged under a 
proper knowledge and sense of the obligation which the law would impose 
upon him by virtue of that engagement." 
In another case (Ruding v. Smith, 1821, 2 Hagg. Cons. 371) Lord 
Stowell expressly guarded himself as being understood as favoring the 
lex domicilii. "I do not mean to say," he says, "that Huber is correct in 
laying down as universally true, that 'personales qualitates, alieni in certo 
loco jure impressas, ubique circumferri, et personam comitari,' that a 
man, being of age in his own country, is of age in every other country, 
be the law of majority in that country what it may." 
6. Inl 1860 Sir Creswell still laid down the old rule regarding capacity 
for marriage, stating in general terms that the capacity to contract is 
subject to the lex loci contractus. Simonin v. Mallac, 1860, 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; 
29 L.]. Mat. 97; 6 Jur. (N. S.) 561; 2 L. T. 327. 
7. (1877) 3 P. D. (C. A.) 1, at p. 5; 44 L. J.P. 23; 3 P. D. 1; 37 L. T. 
415; 26 w. R. 455. ' 
8. (1888) 13 App. Cas. H. L. Sc. 88, at p. 99; 59 L. J. 1. 
9. Foote, Private International Jurisprudence, 4th ed., pp. 338-339. 
10. (1908) P. (C. A.) 46; 77 L. J. P. 34; 97 L. T.' 827; 24 T. L. R. 94. 
11. (1909) P. 67. 78 L.]. P. 23; 99 L. T. 885; 55 S. J. 163; 25 T. L. R. 146. 
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The absence of recent decisions on the question of commer-
cial. capacity and the uncertain pronouncements on the subject 
by the English courts in connection with marriage contracts 
make it impossible to state what the English law actually is. 
W estlake12 is of the opinion that the net result of the English 
decisions supports the view that the law of domicile governs the 
capacity to contract, except that in marriage contracts, the lex 
loci celebrationis must also be satisfied. Dicey13 concludes, on 
the other hand, that the rule laid down by Lord Eldon in Male 
v. Roberts remains unaffected by the later English cases, and 
that the capacity to enter commercial contracts is probably to be 
determined by the law of the country where the contract was 
made. 
2. American La.w: The American law is in a somewhat less 
uncertain state than the English. As the commercial life of the 
nation grew, the lex domicilii was found inconvenient, and was 
discarded as inconsistent with our conditions, at least as regards 
married women.14 The prevailing rule thus became the lex loci 
contractus.1z A remnant of the lex domicilii is found in those 
decisions which hold that the courts of the domicile of an infantl6 
12. Private International Law, 5th ed., pp. 43, 46-48. 
13. Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., Rule 149, exception 1, p. 538. 
14. "We do not think the continental rule applicable to our situation 
and condition. A state has the undoubted right to define the capacity or 
incapacity of its inhabitants, be they residents or temporary visitors; and 
in this country where travel is so common, and business has so little 
regard for state lines, it is more just, as well as more convenient, to have 
regard to the laws of the state of contract as a uniform rule operating 
on all contracts, and which the contracting parties may be presumed to 
have had in contemplation when making their contracts than to require 
them, at their peril, to know the domicile of those with whom they deal, 
and to ascertain the law of that domicile, however remote, which in many 
cases could not be done without such delay as would greatly cripple the 
power of contracting abroad at all." Deemer, J., in Nichols & Shepard 
Co. v. Marshall, (1899) 108 Iowa, 518, 79 N. W. 282. 
15. Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Marshall, (1899) 108 Iowa 518, 79 N. W. 
282; International Harvester Co. v. McAdams, (1910) 142 Wis. 114. 124 
N. W. 1042; Thompson v. Taylor, (1901) 66 N.J. Law 253; 49 Atl. 544; 
54 L. R A. 585; 88 Am. St. Rep. 485; .Bell v. Packard, (1879) 69 Me. 
105; 31 Am. Rep. 251; Milliken v. Pratt, (1877) 125 Mass. 374; 28 Am. 
Rep. 241. 
Story preferred already the lex loci contractus in his famous work on 
the Conflict of Laws and contributed largely to the adoption of the rule 
in this country. In Section 102 of his treatise he says, "Secondly,: As to 
acts done, and rights acquired and contracts made in other countries 
(than the place of domicile), touching property therein the law of the 
country where the acts are done, the rights are acquired, or the contracts 
are made, will generally govern in respect to the capacity, state; and condi-
tion of persons." 
16. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, (1912) 206 N. Y. 188; 99 
N. E. 722. The court in this case, per Vann, J., said, "We think that the 
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or a married woman1 ' may decline to enforce their contracts en-
tered into in a foreign state and valid under the law of such 
state, when their enforcement would contravene the established 
policy of the forum having for its object the protection of in-
fants and married women. 
The same rule applies where the contract is made by cor-
respondence.J-B The law of the place of payment, or the law of 
the state with reference to which the parties may have intended 
to contract, is of no consequence.10 
Whether the above rules apply to infants' contracts can not 
be stated definitely. Thompson v. Ketcham20 appears to be the 
only case involving the question. This case was decided, how-
ever, upon its second appeal to the Supreme Court of New York, 
on a_ question of evidence. On the first appeal the plea of in-
fancy was held to be controlled by the law of the place of per-
formance, and it seems that Chancellor Kent, who wrote the 
-------- --------- ---·------····---
. 
facts stated show that the contract wherever made was to be performed 
by both parties substantially in this state and that it should be governed 
by its laws. Our courts will not enforce the contract of an infant against 
him, even if technically it was completed by acceptance in another state, 
when his promise was not only made here but entire performance by one 
party and substantial performance by the other was to be made here. 
Otherwise it would be easy to deprive an infant of the protection which 
our law affords him on grounds of public policy." 
17. First National Bank v. Shaw, (1902) 109 Tenn. 237; 70 S. W. 807; 
59 L. R. A. 498; 97 Am. St. Rep. 840; Armstrong v. Best, (1893) 112 N. C. 
59; 17 S. E. 14; 25 L. R. A. 188; 34 Am. St. Rep. 473. 
18. Milliken v. Pratt, (1877) 125 Mass. 374; 28 Am. Rep. 241 ; Thompson 
v. Taylor, (1901) 66 N. J. L. 253; 49 Atl. 544; 54 L. R. A. 585; 88 Am. 
St. Rep. 485. 
19. Cockburn v. Kingsley, (1913) 25 Colo. App. 89; 135 Pac. 1112; Gar-
rigue v. Kellar, (1905) 164 Ind. 676; 74 N. E. 523; 69 L. R. A. 870; 108 
Am. St. Rep. 324; Campbell v. Crampton, 18 Blatchf. 150; Hager v. Nat. 
German American Bank, (1898) 105 Ga. 116; 31 S. E. 141; but see Mayer 
v. Roach, (1909) 77 N. J. L. 681; 75 Atl. 235; Basilea & Calandra v. 
Spagnuola, (1910) 80 N. J. L. 88; 77 Atl. 531. . . 
20. (1809) 4 Johns. 285; (1811) 8 Johns. 189. 
In this case suit was brought in New York upon a note executed in 
Jamaica, the defense being infancy. The judge charged the jury that as 
the contract was made in Jamaica, it must be governed by the laws of 
that island, and as there was no proof that the laws of Jamaica protect 
infants against such contracts, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The 
jury accordingly found a verdict for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment on the ground that the testimony in the case showed 
the note to be payable in New York on the arrival of the parties there, so 
that the law of New York would govern. "For, it is a well settled rule,'' 
said the learned Court. "that where a contract is made in reference to 
another country in which it is to be executed. it must be governed by the 
laws of the place where it is to have its effect." ( 4 Johns, at p. 288). 
When the case came again before the Supreme Court the parol testimony 
that the payment of the note was to be made in New York was held 
inadmissible. The defendant not having proved the law of Jamaica, 
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. 
HeinOnline  -- 1 Minn. L. Rev. 15 1917
CONFLICT OF LAWS APPLICABLE TO BILLS AND NOTES 15 
opinion of the court, when the case came before it the second 
time, concurred in that view. 21 
The suggestion has been made that, inasmuch as infants' con-
tracts are not void, but voidable only, the defense of infancy be-
ing in the nature of a privilege granted to the infant, these cases 
do not involve a question of capacity in any true sense, but the 
obligation of the contract, which, in accordance with the general 
weight of authority in this country, is controlled by the law of 
the place of performance.22 There is no decision, however, 
which sanctions such a distinction. The question is actually re-
garded by the English and American courts as one relating to 
capacity. 
Where the question concerns not so much the consequences 
of infancy as the fact of infancy itself, the lex domicilii enters 
as a third factor to complicate the problem. Assuming that the 
lex loci contractus governs the consequences of the plea of in-
fancy, does the same law decide also whether or not a person 
is of age? \i\There a party has reached the age of majority under 
the local law, the defense that he is still a minor under the lex 
domicilii would probably be denied. It is more doubtful whether, 
in the converse case, that is, where the party is a major under 
the law of his domicile, but is still a minor under the law of the 
place of contracting, the defense of infancy could be set up. 
There are dicta, but no square decisions, to the effect that the 
law of the place where the contract was entered into should con-
trol.23 
3· French Law:24 The capacity of French subjects is deter-
mined by French la.w irrespective of the place where the bill or 
21. "The lex loci is to govern, unless the parties had in view a different 
place, by the terms of thi! contract. Si partes alium in contrahendo locum 
respexerint. This is the language of Huber. Lord Mansfield, in Robin-
son v. Bland, (2 Burr. 1077) says, 'The law of the place can never be the 
rule where the transaction is entered into with an express view to the law 
of another country, and that was the case with the contract in that 
cause.'" Kent. Ch. ]., 8 Johns., at p. 193. 
22. Parmele, in Wharton's Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 3d ed., p. 
911; also in note 26 L. R. A. (N. S.), at page 769. But see Minor, Conflict 
of Laws, p. 149, note. 
23. See Andrews v. His Creditors, (1838) 11 La. 464; Phoenix Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Simons, 52 Mo. App. 357; Huey's Appeal, (1854) 1 
Grant's Cas. 51. See also Wharton, 3d ed., pp. 264-265. 
A number of cases which rejected the lex domicilii as determining the 
status of a party as a major involved the question of the party's capacity 
to sue (Gilbreath v. Bunce, (1877) 65 Mo. 349) or to control a judgment 
(Harris v. Berry, (1884) 82 Ky. 137) and not ordinary commercial 
capacity. 
24. Since the days of the statutists the view has generally prevailed on 
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note is executed or payable.2:; The personal (national) law is 
applied also to foreigners. A party can not avail himself of his 
foreign personal law if he has fraudulently concealed the same, 
or if its application would contravene the public policy of 
France.26 The courts have tended to disregard the foreign per-
sonal law in favor of the lex loci contractus, also, when the in-
terests of a Frencl~man, who had exercised due care, would be 
prejudiced by its application.27 
4· German Law: The German law is found in Article 84 
of the German Exchange Law of 1849, which reads as follows: 
"The capacity of a foreigner to incur liabilities under ex-
change law is to be decided according to the law of the state to 
which he belongs. Nevertheless, a foreigner, incapable of con-
tracting by exchange law according to the law of his own coun-
try, is liable within the Empire (Inland), if he incur such liabili-
ties, in so far as he i;; so capable according to inland law."28 
This rule has now become the general rule governing the 
Conflict of Laws, for Article 7 of the Law of Introduction of the 
Civil Code provides : 
the continent that the personal law, formerly the lex domicilii, to-day 
more commonly the law of nationality (lex patriae), should determine 
both the status and the contractual capacity of parties. 
For a discussion of the views of the early jurists, see Laine, Introduc-
tion au Droit International Prive, II pp. 116-198; Burge, Commentaries 
on Colonial and Foreign Laws, new ed., pp. 471-474; Story, Co11flict of 
Laws, 8th ed., pp. 69-84. 
In the event of a change of domicile the more general opinion favored 
the law of the actual domicile at the time of contracting and not that of 
the domicile of origin. See Laine, II, pp. 199-217. So also the modern 
authors. See Savigny, Private International Law, Guthrie's translation, 
p. 355; v. Bar's Private International Law, Gillespie's translation, pp. 317-
318. 
25. Code Civil, Art. 3. 
26. Weiss, Traite de Droit International Pi:ive; 2d ed., IV, p. 442. 
27. Cass. Jan. 16, 1861 (D. 1861, 1, 193), App. Bordeaux, Apr. 11, 1906 
(33 Clunet 1119) ; App. Lyon, Apr. 30, 1907 (35 Clunet 141). See also, 
Vincent et Penaud, Dictionnaire de Droit International Prive, pp. 339-340, 
Weiss, IV, pp. 442-443, note; Lyon-Caen et Renault, Traite de Droit 
Commercial, 4th ed., IV, pp. 542-543, note. 
28. The same provision is found in the Hungarian Law of 1876 (Art. 
95) ; the Scandinavian Law of 1880 (Art. 84) ; the -Swiss Law of Obliga- · 
tions of 1881 (Art. 822) ; the Commercial Code of Servia (Art. 168) ; 
the Russian Law on Bills and Notes (Art. 82), and the law of Brazil of 
1908 (Art. 42). See, Weiss, IV, p. 443. 
The exception to the application of the personal law was adopted in 
Germany only after a long debate at the Conference of Leipzig, on 
grounds of commercial convenience, by a vote of 10 to 9. It was aimed 
primarily at the special incapacities relating to bills and notes which ex-
isted in many of the continental states. The wording of the exception in 
favor of the lex loci contractus was couched, however, in such broad 
terms as to :cover all kinds of incapacity, general or special. See, Staub, 
Kommentar zur allgemeinen deutschen \Vechselordnung, 3d ed., Art. 84; 
Meili, Internationales Civil- und Handelsrecht, II, pp. 327-329. 
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"The business capacity of a person ( Geschaftsfiihigkeit) is 
adjudged according to the laws of the state to which he belongs. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
"If a foreigner enters into a legal transaction in this country 
as to which he is not competent, or is restricted in his capacity, 
he is as to such transactions to be regarded as competent in so 
far as he, under the Gern1an laws, would be competent to act. 
This provision does not apply to transactions relative to family 
rights and to rights of inheritance, as well as to transactions dis-
posing of real estate in a foreign country."29 
The above concession in favor of the lex loci contractus i! 
restricted to transactions entered into in Germany.30 Whenever 
the contract is executed in a foreign country, the national law of 
the party in question will control without qualification. This is 
true though the law of such country should make a similar con-
cession in favor of the lex loci contractus as the German law.31 
Where the national law has adopted the lex domicilii as the rule 
governing capacity, and the domicile of the party is in Germany, 
German law will be held to controJ.32 
5· Italian Law: According to Article 6 of the Preliminary 
Dispositions of the Civil Code, "The status and the capacity of 
persons and the family relations are regulated by the law of tht 
state of which they are subjects." 
Article 58 of the Commercial Code provides, however, that 
"The form and the essential requisites of commercial obligations 
* * * are regulated respectively by the laws and usages of 
the place where the obligations are created * * *" 
An express reservation is made by Article 58 in favor of the 
application of Article 9 of the Preliminary Dispositions of the 
Civil Code, according to which the national law will govern 
when both parties have the same nationq.lity. 
The Italian authors are divided on the question whether the 
"essential requisites of commercial obligations" are to be under-
29. A similar provision exists in regard to capacity to sue or to be sued. 
Such capacity exists if it is conferred by the national law or by German 
' law. Sec. 55, German Code of Civil Procedure; Barazetti, Das Interna-
tionale Privatrecht im biirgerlichen Gesetzbuche fiir das deutsche Reich, 
p. 43. 
30. The place of performance is immaterial, RG, Oct. 16, 1885, (Clunet, 
Journal de Droit International Prive, 1887, p. 630). 
31. v. Bar, p. 669; Niemeyer, das internationale Privatrecht des burger-
lichen Gesetzbuchs, pp. 125-126. 
32. Art. 27, Law of Introduction, Civil Code. · 
I 
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stood as including capacity.33 In the opinion of some,34 the 
article refers only to the general objective requirements for bills 
and notes specified in Article 251 of the Co~mercial Code, and 
not to capacity. "According to the opinion that has finally pre-
vailed," says Diena,35 "the essential requisites of commercial 
obligations, to which Article 58 alludes, are all those contemplated 
by Article I 104 of the Civil Code, among which is included the 
capacity to contract." The lex loci contractus will determine not 
only the capacity of foreigners in Italy, but also that of Italian 
subjects in foreign countries.36 
From the preceding comparative study it is seen that none of 
the countries, the law of which has been studied, applies, with-
out qualification, the personal,law of the parties (the lex domicilii 
or the lex patriae) in the determination of the capacity of parties 
to enter commerciai contracts.37 This is most noteworthy in 
view of the strong stand by continental Europe in support of the 
doctrine that the personal law should govern the capacity of 
parties in general. Individual authors, in the theoretical atmos-
phere of their study, have expressed the view 'that the principle 
of the lex patriae should not yield in any respect, on grounds of 
expediency, to the lex loci contractus.38 But whenever they were 
confronted with the actual needs of business life, they have not 
hesitated to·make such concessions. This appears most distinctly 
from the resolutions adopted by international associations. con-
ferences, and congresses. The Association for the Reform and 
Codification of International Law, at its session at Antwerp in 
1877/9 the Congress of Commercial Law held at Antwerp in 
33. The views of the different writers are stated by Diena, Trattato di 
Diritto Commerciale Internazionale, I, pp. 14-15, note; Ottolenghi, La 
Cambiale nel Diritto Internazionale, pp. 28-43. 
34. See Ottolenghi, pp. 37-38. 
35. I, p. 138. 
36. Diena, III, p. 53. 
37. Contra: Quebec, where the lex domicilii is applied, even though the 
party would have capacity under the law of Quebec, where the contract 
was entered into. Jones v. Dickinson, R. ]. R., 7 Quebec S. C. 313; 
Lafleur, Conflict of Laws in the Province of Quebec, p. 147. 
38. Audinet, Principes elementaires du Droit International Prive, 2d 
ed., pp. 607-609, Despagnet, Precis de Droit International Prive, 5th ed., 
p. 986; Ottolenghi, -p. 16; Surville et Arthuys, Cours elementaire de Droit 
International Prive, 5th ed., pp. 669-670. 
39. Revue de Droit International, 1877, p. 411. 
The resolution adopted was as follows : "La capacite d'un etranger en 
matiere de lettre de change est en general reglee d'apres son statut per-
sonnel. 
"Toutefois l'etranger, lorsqu'il contracte_ des engagements se rattachant 
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r885/0 and in Brussels in r888,41 and the Institute of Interna-
tional Law at its session at Brussels in r88S/2 have all indorsed 
the lex loci contractus as an alternative rule to the law of nation-
ality whenever a party, who is incompetent under his foreign per-
sonal law, has capacity to contract under the law of the state 
where the contract was made. 
Article 74 of the Convention of the Hague for the Unifica-
tion of Bills and Notes of rgr2 expresses the same view. It 
provides: 
"The capacity of a person to bind himself by a bill of ex-
change shall be d~termined by his national law. If such national 
law declares the law of another state to be applicable, such latter 
law shall be applied. 
"A person who lacks capacity under the law indicated in the 
preceging paragraph, shall nevertheless be validly bound, if he 
has entered into the obligation within the territory of a state ac-
cording to the law of which he would have been competent."43 
The Institute of International Law, at its session in Lau-
sanne in r888,44 recommended a somewhat narrower rule with 
regard to the application of the lex loci contractus, which would 
allow the lex loci to impose liability only in the event that the 
incompetent misled the other party or "grave circumstances" 
existed, the appreciation of which was to be left to the courts. 
Several members of the Institute of International Law have 
suggested still other compromise systems. At the meeting of 
the Institute at Lausanne,Westlake45 proposed the lex loci con-
tractus in substitution for the lex patriae when the party who 
was incompetent under his national law, was twenty-one years 
of age, and the other contracting party was ignorant of such in-
capacity. Von Bar4c was of the opinion that the lex loci con-
tractus should take the place of the lex patriae when the person 
dealing with the party who is incompetent acted in good faith. 
In his text book on Private International Law, v. Bar expressed 
his view in the following form: 
"It is immaterial whether or not a person has capacity to bind 
himself by bill, be that incapacity a result of a general incapacity 
aux lettres de change dans un pays autre que le sien, est n!gi par les lois 
de ce pays, sans pouvoir invoquer sa loi nationale." 
40. Clunet, 1885, p. 629. 
41. Weiss IV, p. 444. 
42. Annuaire de 1' Institut de Droit International Prive, VIII, p. 97. 
43. See Senate Document No. 162, 63d Congress, 1st Session, p. 64. 
44. Annuaire, X, pp. 103-104. 
45. Annuaire, X, p. 102. 
46. Annuaire, X, p. 96. 
HeinOnline  -- 1 Minn. L. Rev. 20 1917
20 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 
to contract or not, if by the law of the place where the bill is 
issued the debtor had this capacity, and the person who sues on 
the bill or some predecessor of his in title was in good faith when 
he acquired the bill. Good faith is presumed."47 
Goldschmid submitted that the contract should be sustained, 
notwithstanding an incapacity under the personal law, if it com-
plied with the law governing the validity of the contract in other 
respects.48 
In addition to the above there may be mentioned the view 
recently expressed by Professor Jitta, one of the most distin-
guished writers on the subject of the Conflict of Laws. In his 
opinion the . capacity to contract by bill or note should be gov-
erned by the law of what he terms "the fiduciary place of issue,'' 
by which he means the law of the place of issue mentioned in 
the bill or note, and, in the absence of such an indication, that of 
the party's domicile, or, in case of a person exercising a trade or 
profession, the law of the state in which he has his place of busi-
ness or office.49 
As the question before us has nothing to do with the per-
formance of the contract, the lex loci solutionis can apply only 
on one of two theories, either that it represents the seat of the 
obligation, or that it expresses the probable intention of the par-
ties. That neither of these positions is tenable as. regards the 
formal and essential requisites of bills and notes will be shown 
in another part of this article. The same is true also with re-
spect to capacity. In this place the bare statement must suffice 
that the intention theory as such is inapplicable to capacity. Be-
fore there can be a legal intent, there must be capacity to form 
such intent, and such capacity, in the. very nature of things, can 
be conferred only by law. This is admitted by the decisions of 
the courts of all countries, excepting a few dicta in this coun-
try,S0 and by all text writers. There remain thus for our con-
' sideration, the lex loci contractus and the lex domicilii. 
The objection to the strict application of the personal law in 
commercial contracts has been well expressed in the following 
words by Burge: 
"The obstacles to commercial intercourse between the sub-
47. v. Bar, p. 668, note. 
48. See Annuaire, X, pp. 80-81. . 
49. Jitta, La Substance des Obligations dans 1e Droit International Prive, 
II, p. 53. 
50. See, Mayer v. Roach, (1909) 77 N. J. L. 681, 75 Atl.. 235; Basilea & 
Calandra v. Spagnuola, (1910) 80 N. J. L. 88, 77 Atl. 531. 
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jects of foreign states would be almost insurmountable, if a party 
must pause to ascertain, not by the means within his reach, but 
by recourse to the law of the domicile of the person with whom 
he was dealing, whether the latter had attained the age of major-
ity, and, consequently, whether he is competent to enter into a 
valid and binding contract."51 • 
As between the unqualified lex domicilii and that of the lex 
loci contractus, the balance of convenience would clearly ·favor 
the latter. The real question at issue is whether a compromise 
system between the personal law (lex domicilii or lex patriae) 
and the lex loci contractus, in the form in which it obtains in 
France or Germany, or in one of the other forms suggested above, 
is not preferable to that of the lex loci contractus pure and simple, 
which is the rule in the United States and Italy. 
Supporters of the compromise system believe that the per-
sonal law should not be discarded in its entirety and that the 
needs of commerce can be sufficiently met by certain concessions 
to the law of the place where the contract was entered into. 
Little argument is needed to show that neither the French nor 
the German system can be approved. The French courts have 
been inclined, when the contract was made in France,. to protect 
French subjects acting with due care, against the incapacity of 
the other contracting party existing under the lex patriae. The 
objection to this qualification of the personal law is the distinction 
made between citizens and foreigners.52 If the security of com-
merce demands that an incapacity existing under foreign law 
shall not be set up, it includes citizens and foreigners alike.. The 
German law is equally arbitrary. It applies the lex loci to trans-
actions entered into in Germany when it will bind the party who 
is incompetent under his personal law, but does not recognize 
that a German subject, who has made a contract abroad, can be 
held under like conditions. The giving of such a privileged posi-
tion to citizens is in violation of the principle of equality, which 
is fundamental in the Conflict of Laws. 
The recommendation of the Institute ·of International Law 
adopted at its session at Lausanne, is open to the serious objec-
tion of indefiniteness, for the lex loci contractus is to apply 
when "grave circumstances" exist, the appreciation of which is 
to be left to the courts. Such a qualification as this is entirely 
too vague to serve th.e purpose of commercial security. 
51. Burge, II, p. 477. 
52. The Supreme Court of Louisiana expressed similar views in Saul v. 
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The compromise system that has the weightiest support53 
allows the application of the lex loci contractus whenever it will 
sustain the contract of a party who is incompetent under his per-
sonal law. 
Of the individual views above mentioned, those of Westlake 
and v. Bar do not differ essentially from the compromise view 
just stated. Both would require for the application of the local 
law, that the party dealing with the incompetent shall have been 
ignorant of the latter's incompetency (Westlake) or have acted 
in good faith (v. Bar), Westlake requiring in addition that the 
incompetent be twenty-one years of age. Meili regards the rule 
suggested by v. Bar as the best, and as satisfying all "rational 
commercial needs."54 Goldschmid55 properly remarks, however, 
that the condition of good faith opens the door wide to difficult 
questions of fact and that because of this, such a rule forms too 
vaccilating a basis for the security of international relations. The 
same objections may be raised also against Westlake's proposi-
tion. 
Goldschmid's view differs from that of the majority before 
mentioned in his substitution of the law governing the contract 
for that of the lex loci contractus. In a state or country which 
has adopted the lex loci solutionis for the determination of the 
validity of contracts, a person who is competent under such law 
would be bound under this rule notwithstanding the fact that he 
is incompetent under the lex domicilii and the lex loci contractus. 
For practical purposes it may be said, then, that there are only 
two leading views involving a compromise between the personal 
law and the lex loci contractus: (1) The majority view, which 
sustains the contract, as far as capacity is concerned, if it satis-
fies either the personal law or that of the place of contracting; 
and, (2) Goldschmid's view, which regards the contract as valid 
if it complies with the requirements of the personal law or with 
those governing the contract in other respects. Widely differing 
from these, is the view entertained by Jitta, according to which 
the law of the place of issue mentioned in the instrument is to 
govern, and only in the absence of such an indication, the law of 
His Creditors, (1827) 17 Mart. 596. 
53. It will be recalled that it was recommended by the Association for the 
Reform and Codification of Law (1887) ; by the Congresses of Com-
mercial Law of Antwerp (1885) and of Brussels (1888) ; by the Institute 
{)f International Law (1885); and by the Convention of the Hague (1912). 
54. Internationales Civil- und Handelsrecht, II, p. 326. 
55. Annuaire, X, p. 91. 
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the domicile, or, in the case of a merchant or a professional man, 
the law of the state in which he has his place of business or 
office. 
What are the merits of these views as compared with the 
American and Italian rule, which supports the lex loci contractus? 
In behalf of the lex loci contractus the following words of Jus-
tice Gray, from his opinion in Milliken v. Pratt/6 may be quoted: 
"In the great majority of cases, especially in this country, 
where it is so common to travel, or to tr(!,nsact business through 
agents, or to correspond by letter, from one state to another, it 
is more just, as weU. as more convenient, to have regard to the 
law of the place of the contract, as a uniform rule operating on 
all contracts of the same kind, and which the contracting parties 
must be presumed to have in contemplation when making their o 
contracts, than to require them at their peril to know the domicile 
of those with whom they deal, and to ascertain the law of that 
domicile, how<:ver remote, which in many cases could not be done 
without such delay as would greatly cripple the power of con-
tracting abroad at all." 
A similar view is e.--cpressed by Burge :57 
"But if the principle be correct that the lex loci contractus 
ought to determine the validity of a contract when that validity 
depends ori the capacity of the contracting party, it must be uni-
formly applied, whether the law prevailing in the domicile be 
that which capacitates or incapacitates. For it would not be 
reasonable that two different laws should be applied to one and 
the same contract, and that the liability of one of the parties 
should be decided by the lex loci contractus and that of the other 
by the lex loci domicilii." 
In connection with the foregoing quotations it must be borne 
in mind that Justice Gray and Burge discussed the question as a 
pure judicial question, and did not express any view upon it from 
the standpoint of legislation. Story calls attention to the differ-
ence between the two view points. Commenting upon a state-
ment in Saul v. His Creditors/8 he says: 
56. (1877) 125 Mass. 374, at p. 382; 28 Am. Rep. 241. 
57. Colonial and Foreign Law, II, p. 483. 
58. The passage referred to was the following: 
"But reverse the facts of this case, and suppose, as is the truth, that our 
law placed the age of majority at twenty-one; that twenty-five was the 
period at which a man ceased to be a minor in the country where he 
resided; and that, at the age of twenty-four he came into this state, and 
entered into contracts ;-would it be permitted that he should, in our 
courts, and to the demand of one of our citizens, plead, as a protection 
against his engagements, the laws of a foreign country, of which the people 
of Louisiana had no knowledge, and would we tell them that ignorance of 
foreign laws, in relation to a contract made here, was to prevent them 
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"The case first put seems founded upon a principle entirely 
repugnant to that upon which the second rests. In the former 
case, the law of the place of the domicile of the party is allowed 
to prevail, in respect to a contract made in another country. In 
the latter case, the law of the place where the contract is made, 
is allowed to govern without any reference whatsoever to the 
law of the domicile of the party. Such a course of decision cer-
tainly may be adopted by a government if it shall so choose. But · 
then it would seem to stand upon mere arbitrary legislation and 
positive law,. and not upon principle. The difficulty is in seeing 
how a court, without any such positive legislation, could arrive 
at both condusions. Ge.neral reasoning would lead us to the 
opinion that both cases ought to be decided in the same ·way, that 
is, either by the law of the domicile of the party, or by that of 
the place where the contract is actually made. Many foreign 
jurists maintain the former opinion, some the latter."59 
As a judicial question it might naturally be felt that an alter-
native rule in the form of the foregoing compromise systems 
could not be adopted by our courts without the aid of positive 
legislation and th~t a choice had to be made between the lex 
domicilii and the lex loci contractus. In one or two instances, it 
is true, English and American courts have sanctioned an alterna-
tive rule either actually or in effect. For example, the English 
case of In re Hellmann's Will60 held that a legacy under an Eng-
lish will might be paid to a German legatee on his attaining full 
age according to English law or according to the law of Germany, 
whichever first happened. The American courts, in their eager-
ness to uphold contracts against the defence of usury, have al-
lowed the parties to contract with reference to the law of the 
place of execution or with reference to that of the place of per-
formance or even with reference to the law of a third state with 
which the contract was connected.61 But these cases represent 
outstanding exceptions in the Conflict of Laws to the general 
attitude of Anglo-American courts, which declined to sanction 
a rule in the alternative even in the matter of the formal require-
ments of instruments, 62 in regard to which the maxim locus actum 
in a permissive ·sense had been recognized on the continent for 
enforcing it, though' the agreement was binding by those of their own 
state? Most assuredly we would not." Saul v. His Creditors, (1827) 17 
Mart., at pp. 597-598. 
59. Story, Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., pp. 96-97. · 
60. L. R. 2 Eq. 363; 14 W. R. 682. 
61. Miller v. Tiffany, (1863) 1 Wall. 298; 17 Law ed. 540; Arnold v. 
Potter, (1867) 22 Ia. 194; Green v. Northwestern Trust Co., (1914) 128 
Minn. 30, 150 N. W. 229; Scott v. Perlee, (1863) 39 Ohio St. 63. 
62. See Stanley v. Bernes, (1830) 3 Hagg. 373; Moultrie v. Hunt, (1861) 
23 N.Y. 394. 
\ . 
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centuries. This maxim has since been adopted by statute in Eng-
land as regards wills disposing of personalty, and in many juris-
dictions of this country as regards wills and deeds. A will of 
personal property is valid under these statutes if it satisfies, as 
regards formal execution, the law of the testator's domicile or 
that of the place of execution, and a will devising realty, or a 
deed of land, if it conforms to the law of the situs or to the lex 
loci contractus. In like manner it might be provided by statute 
that a legal transaction, or, to narrow the question to the subject 
under consideration, a commercial contract, shall be valid, as re-
gards capacity, if it meets the requirements of the law of the 
place of execution or those of another state, be that law the lex 
domicilii or the lex loci solutionis. But is there a sufficient reason 
for the adoption of such an alternative rule in this instance? 
Field, in his Outlines of an International Code, recommends 
the lex loci contractus as the rule governing capacity to contract; 
In Sec. 542 he states : _ 
"The civil capacities and incapacities of an individual in refer-
ence to a transaction between living persons, except so far as it 
affects immovable property, * * * are governed by the law 
of the place where the transaction is had, whatever may be his 
national character or domicile." 
In answer to the continental writers who dwell upon the in-
convenience which would result from a fluctuating rule of capa-
city upon every accidental change of the person or of his movable 
property, he says: 
"The inconvenience of a fluctuating rule is an inconvenience 
to the individual only, requiring him to ascertain and conform 
to the law of the place where he may be. It is the most conven-
ient form for facilitating commercial transactions and the admin-
istration of justice."63 
These words were written before the Institute of International 
Law and the international commercial congresses above men-
tioned had indorsed the view upholding commercial contracts 
with respect to capacity, if they satisfied either the personal law 
or the law of the place where. the contract was made. It is es-
pecially interesting to note, therefore, that Field had reached the 
same result in an independent way, as regards foreign infants. 
With respect to them he suggested the following exception; 
• 
"543· No transaction had by a foreigner, being one between 
living persons, is voidable on the ground of his infancy, except 
63. p. 380. 
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so far as it may affect immovables, if either the law of his domi-
cile, or the law of the place where the transaction is had, sustains 
his capacity." 
In considering the relative merits of the compromise 
systems which have been put forward on the continent, and 
those of the lex loci contractus, the difference in the poin't of 
view between the continental and American law must be 
clearly borne in mind. On the continent the established 
rule governing capacity, on principle, is the personal law (the 
lex patriae or the lex domicilii). The only question as regards 
the capacity to execute bills and notes, therefore, is whether 
the personal law should not yield on grounds of commercial 
convenience, at least in part, to the law of the place where the 
contract i$ made. The problem assumes quite a different 
aspect in the' United States, where the simplicity and con-
venience of the lex loci contractus as the governing law have 
seemed so manifest as to overshadow completely the claims of 
the lex domicilii.64 Although a uniform law would raise the 
question in a somewhat different form by reason of the fact 
that it is concerned with international and not with inter-state 
relations,65 the burden of proving the desirability of a modi-
fication of the present law which shall sustain a bill or note, 
as regards capacity, in the event the party in question is 
incompetent under the lex loci contractus but has capacity 
under the lex domicilii, would be upon the person proposing 
such a change. 
All partisans of the lex domicilii having been compelled, 
on grounds of commercial convenience, to admit the neces-
sity of the application of the lex loci contractus, as regards 
capacity to enter commercial contracts, when such law is un-
favorable to a party, the question naturally arising is why 
the same law, rather than the lex domicilii, should not govern 
also when it is favorable to such party. The main argument 
advanced by continental writers in support of the lex domicilii 
in the matter of capacity is the following,-that rules of law 
which are concerned with capacity to act have for their object 
64. Notwithstanding the fact ·that the majority of an infant for the 
purpose of receiving his property from his guardian is determined by the 
lex domicilii. Woodward v. Woodward, (1889), 87 Tenn. 644; 11 
s. w. 892. 
65. The Negotiable Instruments Law has unified the law of bills and 
notes in this country to all intents and purposes. Only a few jurisdic-
tions have modified the proposed uniform law in some particulars. 
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the protection of the parties against loss by their own acts. 
"This care for the person must be a permanent one," says v. 
Bar, 66 "if it is to have effect; it extends, therefore, to all persons 
who permanently belong to the state, i. e., who are domiciled 
there!' In other words, it is because of the uniform and per-
manent ptotection which the parties need and which the lex 
domicilii, ex hypothesi, is best able to afford that its claim to 
a preference over any other law is based. But if the le.x 
domicilii must yield to the 1ex loci contractus in all commercial 
contracts in the interest of commercial security, it fails to 
afford the very protection which its adoption was intended to 
give. Under these circumstances no theoretical basis remains 
for its application. For it must be remembered that the lex 
loci contractus is put forward by most of the advocates of the 
compromise view as an alternative rule entitled to extra-
territorial recognition and not merely as an exception to the 
lex domicilii, based upon the public policy of the state where 
the· contract is made, and hence having only an intra-terri-
torial effect. Having adopted the lex loci contractus as the 
governing rule when it will sustain the contract, the logic of 
the situation and sound principle demand that it control also 
when its application will defeat the contract.67 
In the absence of a willingness on the part of the American 
law to accept the lex domicilii as the law governing both 
status and capacity, its introduction as an alternative rule 
with the lex loci in the matter of commercial capacity can be 
justified only on grounds of expediency based on a desire to 
sustain contracts. What does sound policy require in this 
regard? The statutes relating to the formal execution of wills 
and deeds fall short of .giving any support to the proposition 
under discussion, for neither the English nor the American 
statutes include contracts. Even if it were conceded, for the 
sake of argument, that the reasons or policy which led to the 
adoption of these statutes apply with equal force to contracts, 
it would not follow that they would embrace capacity as well. 
There is a fundamental distinction between capacity and 
66. Private International Law, Gillespie's translation, p. 306. 
67. "There is, no doubt, much to be said for a thorough-going applica-
tion of the lex loci actus to rule capacity to undertake these obligations, 
such as prevails in the jurisprudence of England and in that of the 
United States, although it does not suit the circumstances of the Conti-
nent of Europe, and may, as intercourse goes on increasing, soon bring 
disadvantages even to England and to the United States." v. Bar, p 665. 
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formalities and a policy applicable to the one may have ·no 
bearing upon the other. Before the statutes referred to were 
passed, a will of personal property, not executed in the form 
prescribed by the law of the testator's domicile at the time of 
death, was void, even though it conformed to the law of the 
testator's domicile at the time of execution and to the law of the 
place of execution.68 A will or deed disposing of realty was 
null and void unless it satisfied the law of the state in which 
the property was situated.69 Following the continental prac-
tice, many American legislators felt that the validity of a 
will or deed, as regards formal execution, should be recognized 
also if the testator or grantor had followed the requirements 
of the law of the state in which the will or deed was executed. 
The rule locus regit actum, which was thus sanctioned, sprang 
from and rests upon a desire to facilitate international inter-
course.7() Its sole object is to free the parties from the 
embarrassments which may follow if they must clothe their 
legal transactions at their peril in a form prescribed by a 
law to which they have no ready access at the time. 
The situation is quite different, as regards capacity. The 
question here is whether a party who is incompetent under 
the lex loci contractus, which applies upon principle, shall be 
bound nevertheless if he is competent to contract under the 
law of his domicile or the law of some other state that is 
deemed to govern the validity of contracts in other respects. 
Before an answer can be given, the question must be con-
sidered in its broader aspects. It raises many grave problems 
involving the basic theory of the rules of Private International 
Law. If a rule in the alternative is proper in the matter of 
commercial capacity because of its tendency to give stability 
to international transactions, why should not the same policy 
require its extension to capacity in general? And if the rule 
is expedient in matters relating to capacity and form, why 
should it not be applied also to the other essential require-
ments of contracts and, indeed, to those of all other legal 
transactions? Heretofore it was taken for granted in the 
science of Private International Law, that a unitary rule 
governing each legal relationship would best answer the 
68. Stanley v. Bernes, (1830) 3 Hagg, 373; Moultrie v. Hunt, (1861) 
23 N.Y. 394. · 
69. Succession of Hasting, (1905) 114 La. 294; 38 So. 174. 
70. See Laine, II, pp. 116-198. 
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-
needs of an international community. The maxim locus regit 
actum, in matters of formal requirements, constituted the 
only exception, and, according to some writers, 71 even this 
rule had lost its original permissive character and become 
a unitary and mandatory rule. Must it be conceded to-day 
that the aim of the science of the Conflict of Laws to discover 
unitary rules for the solution of the problems arising from 
the diversity of legal systems has so far failed of accomplish-
ing its object that international justice would be promoted 
if the validity of legal transactions in general, as regards 
capacity, form and legality, were sustained upon principles of 
the broadest liberality? 
The writer of this article is not ready to give a final answer 
to this question, affecting as it does the very basis of the 
rules in the Conflic~ of Laws. He is of opinion that the adop-
tion of alternative rules in matters affecting the validity of 
legal transactions would afford, at least in some instances, 
more satisfactory results than it is possible to attain as long 
as a unitary rule must be found. Abundant proof of this 
fact is furnished by the cases and in the juristic literature 
dealing with the essential validity or legality of contracts. 
The vast bulk of the case law, as well as the almost total 
concen,sus of opinion of continental and English writers on 
the subject of the Conflict of Laws hold that a contract is 
valid if it meets the requirements of the law with reference to 
which the parties must be deemed to have contracted.72 In 
most of the decided cases the law of the state that woula 
sustain the contract was found to be the applicatory law and 
not infrequently a presumption was raised that the parties 
contracted with reference to such law.73 With the recognition 
of the propriety of alternative rules in the Conflict of Laws, 
such cases, which now rest upon an unsatisfactory basis, 
would present no difficulties whatever. Neither the territorial 
theory, which underlies the doctrine of the lex loci contractus, 
nor the intentio;,_ theory, which is ·now dominant so far as it 
applies to contracts, leads to satisfactory results, as the 
71. See Buzzati, L'Autorita delle Leggi Straniere Relative alla Forma 
degli Atti Civili, pp. 142 et seq. 
72. For the law of the English courts, of the Federal courts, and of the 
State courts, see article by Professor Beale in 23 Harvard Law Review, 
pp. 1, 79, 194, 260. 
73. See, for example, Pritchard v. Norton, (1882) 106 U. S. 124; 1 Sup. 
Ct. 102; 27 Law Ed. 104. 
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actual state of our law sufficiently attests. A rule to the effect 
that the validity of a contract, as regards capacity, form, and 
legality, should be recognized if it satisfies the lex loci con-
tractus or the law of some other state with"which the contract 
has an intimate relation, might, with proper limitations, fur-
nish a more secure basis for international transactions than 
has existed heretofore. 
As for bills and notes, an alternative rule cannot be applied 
to matters of form or legality for the reason that the obliga-
tions created by such instruments depend upon, and are there-
fore inseparable from, its formal and essential requirements, 
as will be shown below, and an alternative rule cannot possibly 
control the obligations of contracts. Limited, however, to 
capacity, a rule which would sustain a bill or note, or a partic-
ular contract thereon, if it satisfied either the lex lo'ci con-
tractus or the lex domicilii, would not only be practicable, 
but would possess certain advantages over the unitary rule 
of the lex locus contractus'. From the standpoint of municipal 
law it would promote the negotiability of such instruments 
by giving to l:he contracts of the different parties another 
chance of validity. .From the broader viewpoint of inter-
national law such a rule would make it possible for the Eng-
lish law, which has tended to accept the lex domicilii, to agree 
with the American law, and would bring the Anglo-American 
law, so far as it can be done, into harmony with the best 
thought on the subject in continental Europe. 
Nor would the rule suggested constitute an injustice to the 
party obligated. True, he cannot escape liability under it 
unless he lacks capacity under both the lex domicilii and the 
lex loci contractus, but the justice or injustice of a rule cannot 
be determined from the viewpoint of a party who is desirous 
of avoiding his obligations. A person who is domiciled in 
one state but wishes to transact business in another cannot 
in good conscience complain of a rule which enables him to 
do so more effectively by increasing his capacity to contract. 
As against the advantages before mentioned there must 
be offset, however, certain disadvantages which inhere in every 
alternative rule. The lex loci contractus as such has sim-
plicity and certainty in its favor. These important qualities 
would be lost by the adoption of the lex domicilii as an alter-
native rule, for the latter might raise the issue of domicile in 
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every case in which a party is incompetent under the law of 
the place where the contract is made. The increased litigation 
which would result would constitute a serious draw-back 
which can be overcome only by strong grounds of expediency 
speaking for the lex domicilii. Such grounds do not exist. 
The international advantages, referred to above, cannot ac-
tually weigh heavily· in the framing of a Uniform Law for 
the United States. Moreover, international uniformity is un-
attainable as long as the continental countries adhere to the 
law of nationality, instead of the law of domicile, and as for 
England, it may accept the doctrine of :Male v. Roberts, the 
lex loci contractus, as the rule governing commercial con-
tracts and thus agree with the law of this country without 
the introduction of the lex domicilii. The only advantage 
th~t would arise from the adoption of the lex domicilii in 
the form suggested is its tendency to promote the negotiability 
of bills and notes. This advantage, it is submitted, is not 
strong enough to overcome the serious disadvantages to which 
attention has been called above. The burden of proving the 
desirability of departing from the established law being on 
the party advocating the change, it is apparent that no suf-
ficient case has been made out. The conclusion reached is, 
that the Uniform Law should adopt the lex loci contractus as 
the law governing capacity to incur liability by bill or note. 
If, contrary to the conclusion just stated, the policy of 
sustaining contracts is deemed to outweigh the expense and 
inconvenience of increased litigation, so that the principle of 
an alternative rule as regards capacity, stands approved, the 
question, brought to prominence by Goldschmid before the 
Institute of International Law, would be whether the law 
governing the contract in general should not be accepted as 
the alternative rule, rather than the lex domicilii. Goldschmid 
assumed that the law of the place of performance would gov-
ern the contract in general (apart from capacity and form), 
and such is still the German law74 and the prevailing rule in 
this country.75 Why should a party, who is incompetent 
under the lex loci contractus, not be regarded in jurisdictions 
following the above rule as competent to contract if he pos-
74. See RG July 4, 1904 (15 Niemeyer 285) ; RG Apr. 26, 1907 (18 Nie-
meyer 177). 
75. See article by Professor Beale in 23 Harvard Law Review, pp. 1, 79, 
194, 260. 
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sesses such capacity under the law of the place of perform-
ance? This question cannot be answered until the rule gov-
erning the validity and ohligation of bills and notes has been 
discussed. If the conclusion is there reached that the lex 
loci contractus, and not the lex loci solutionis, should control, 
no ground will be left upon which Goldschmid's proposi-
tion can stand. The only other law that could possibly 
control the contract would be the personal law, on the theory 
that the parties must be deemed to have contracted with 
reference to such law. This would make Goldschmid's rule 
coincide with' the one discussed above. But if the Uniform 
Law should follow the weight of authority in this country 
and accept the lex loci solutionis as the law determining the 
validity and obligation of contracts, Goldschmid's sugges-
tion would have great fon;e. The problem would then be 
whether the lex loci solutionis should supplant the lex domi-
cilii as the alternative rule with the lex loci contractus, or 
whether the Uniform Law should go still further in its liber-
ality and support a bill and note, if capacity exists under the 
leX loci contractus, the lex domicilii, or the lex loci solutionis? 
Whether the lex loci contractus be adopted as an absolute 
rule or in one of the alternative forms suggested, its meaning 
remains to be determined. On the continent it signifies gen-
erally, the law of the place where the signature is attached.76 
In England and the United States, inasmuch as the contract 
is not complete until the delivery of the instrument, it is the 
place of delivery.77 But what if, on the continent, the place 
mentioned in the instrument is not the place where the signa-
ture was actually affixed, and if, in the United States, such 
place is not the actual place of delivery? Continental law 
is not settled on this point.78 In this country the place from 
which a bill or note or an indorsement is dated, is deemed 
76. Audinet, pp. 609-610; Surville et Arthuys, p. '671; Lyon-Caen et 
Renault, IV, p. 545; v. Bar, p. 671; Griinhut, Wechselrecht, II, p. 572, 
note 14. 
77. B. E. A. s. 21 ; N. I. L. s. 16. 
78. In favor of the actual place where the signature was affixed Diena, 
III, p. 52; Meili, II, p. 327; Griinhut, W echselrecht, p. 570, note 6. If the 
date was allowed to control, even as to holders in due course, it would 
enable a party who is incompetent to confer capacity upon himself by the 
simple expedient of dating the instrument or contract from a place, 
according to the law of which he is competent. To allow him to do so is 
regarded by the above authors as opposed to public policy. 
Other authors are of opinion that the holder in due course should 
be protected if the party has capacity according to 'the law of the place 
from which it is dated. See v. Bar, p. 688. · 
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prima facie the place of delivery.79 With respect to a holder 
in due course this presumption is conclusive.80 Where the 
indorsement does not indicate the place at which it is pre-
sumptively made, i. e., delivered, but the original instrument 
contains such an indication, the indorsement will be deemed 
made at that place,81 and if a party has capacity under such 
law, he will be estopped as to a holder in due course, to show 
that he had no capacity un<\er the law of the state where the 
indorsement was made in fact.82 
The law of the "fiduciary place of issue", proposed by 
Jitta as the governing rule, according to which the place 
mentioned in the bill, note, or indorsement, controls, and, in 
the absence of such an indication, the law of the party's domi-
cile, or, in the case of a person exercising a trade or profession, 
the law of the state in which he has his place of business or 
office, though it bears a slight resemblance to the American 
law above set forth, differs from it too profoundly to be of 
any practical value in the framing of a uniform law for the 
United States. The rules of the American law should be 
retained. 
(To be continued.) 
ERNEST G. LoRENZEN. 
University of Minnesota. 
79. Lennig v. Ralston, (1854) 23 Pa. 137; Second National Bank v. 
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Houst. (Del.) 576. 
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